



Small Arms Induced Conflicts in Nigeria and its Socio-Economic Implications in the North Central States

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ABSTRACT

Purpose: This academic investigation examined possible security implications of small arms induce conflicts in Nigeria with a particular emphasis in the north-central region. It specifically aims to determine whether there is a link between the prevailing labour shortfall in the region and the small arms-induced conflicts in Nigeria's North-Central states. It also looked at whether the North-Central Nigerian region's existing deficient healthcare delivery system is related to the violence caused by small arms that is now prevalent there.

Methodology: Carl Pearson's Product Moment Correlation Coefficient with the modified student t test and descriptive research design as well as the self-report approach were used in the study to generate the data and examine the relationship between the two key variables from 350 samples taken from the study population, using the theory of failed states as its analytical framework.

Findings: The study reveals a positive correlation between small arms-induced conflicts in Nigeria's North-Central states and the prevailing labour shortfall in the region. It also found that small arms induced violence in the North-Central Nigeria is implicated in the current shallow healthcare delivery system in the region

Originality: This study focuses on the socio-economic implications of small arms induced conflicts in Nigeria with a particular emphasis on the North Central States.

Implications: The study empirically explored the economic and health dimensions of the proliferation of small arms as well as how its resultant affects impinge on the social existence of the affected people globally with particular emphasis on North-central Nigeria. It is expected that this study will guide policymakers, management of both public and private organizations by providing enough insights into the benefits of stringent control of small arms importation in the country.

Keywords: Small Arms, Labour Shortfall. Healthcare, North-Central, Security Challenges

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1. INTRODUCTION

Abuja the Nigeria capital and six additional states, including Benue, Plateau, Kogi, Nasarawa, Niger, and Kwara, are located in North-Central Nigeria, also known as the Middle Belt region. In addition, the term "Middle Belt" refers to a belt region running longitudinally through the center of Nigeria, serving as a crossing point between northern and southern Nigeria. This region, which is the southern half of Nigeria's former Northern Region, is distinguished by the absence of a distinct majority ethnic group (Johnson, 2018). Therefore, there are many minority groups that are prominent, which in some ways creates an ethnic and linguistic barrier in the region and divides it into the predominantly Christian South and the principally Muslim North. This cultural convergence in North Central Nigeria, which also retains a high level of ethnic and linguistic diversity, led to the designation of the area as the "Middle Zone" in terms of the region's multiculturalism (Melzian, 2020). The region is heterogeneous as a result. It is so prevalent that while some ethnic minorities, like the Hausa and Fulani, are seen as migrant settlers, the complex plurality of ethnic minorities is considered indigenous. In North Central Nigeria, established farmers and pastoral or transhumant herders have a long history of varying conflict, rivalry, and cooperation (Azaigba, 2017). According to demographic data, the population of north central Nigeria was 17.3 million in the 1991 census but is now expected to be over 49 million (Ntefo 2023). The socio-cultural makeup of the area reveals that it is multi-religious, with a population that is 65% primarily Christian, 25% Muslim, and 10% practicing African Traditional Religion (Eferebo, 2022). The spread of small arms in recent years has made the area unstable and a breeding ground for militia attacks and sectarian clashes.

The issue of small arms explosion in modern times, particularly at the end of the 20th century and the start of the new millennium, has caused the world to witness more dreadful and destructive small arms-induced conflicts and wars than it ostensibly should have in the years preceding the 21st century. Because of the high incidence of small arms and light weapon proliferations, small arms-induced conflicts and wars in the world and Africa in particular have been fought principally between states and rebels, extremists, and national armies, with the victims being primarily civilians and defenseless groups in society (Baffour, 2014). Small arms-related conflicts caused greater levels of destruction and bloodshed than ever before, as seen in places like Cote d'Ivoire, Iraq, Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Liberia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Yemen, Burundi, Serbia, Georgia, Syria, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, USA, Libya, Mali, and Palestine among others (Obasi, 2014). Conflicts caused by small arms that are recurrent in Africa have a direct impact on the rising level of insecurity. It is known that numerous African nations have tasted small arms and light weapons since the 1980s (Eloma, Ugwumba & Abang 2014). As an example, consider the deadly crisis in the Nigeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, the genocide in Rwanda, the nearly ten-year-long battle in Liberia (1989–1997), the crisis in Sierra Leone, Mali, Guinea, Ghana, South Africa, and Burundi. According to Eloma, et.al (2014), the accessibility and pervasive usage of these small arms and light weapons has major security consequences. This idea undoubtedly inspired Baffour (2014) to assert that recent developments in many regions of the world seem to indicate that the global effort to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons has to be significantly strengthened.

Even though we are focusing on the North Central region of Nigeria in this contest, the violence caused by small guns in North Eastern Nigeria differs greatly from that in the North Central and North Western zones. Radical Islamist organizations trying to establish an Islamic Caliphate or a sphere of influence are the main causes of violence in this area. The Boko Haram terrorist organization operates along this bloc, but not in the north central region, where migrant bandits and killer herdsmen are constantly targeting rural farmers and abducting children from schools. The killer herdsmen's operations in the North Central gained national attention as a result of their increasing use of violence against the region's indigenous farmers in 2014. This occurred as the Boko-Haram threat appeared to be declining in the North-East or being contained

by the Nigerian Armed Forces. Conflicts between herders and farmers are nothing new in Nigeria; they have existed since the beginning of time and have always been resolved through dialogue between the local farmers and the nomadic herders (Olaniyan & Yahaya, 2016). Nevertheless, in 2015, some herders started training their cattle with AK-47 rifles instead of rearing sticks, which added a new dimension to these long-standing disputes between herders and indigenous farmers (Nwezeh, 2021). The historical accounts of the herders' cattle rearing were changed when some of the traditionally peaceful herders turned into kidnapers for ransom, bandits, rapists, murderers, and other societal vices. Even though some have stayed true to their age-old traditional way of life (animal husbandry), it is now quite complicated to distinguish the good herders from the bad ones since they now rear their animals on streets and in close proximity to government buildings where there are no grasses for grazing (2021). According to the Global Terrorism Index Report (2018), as cited in Toromade, (2018) killer herders killed 1700 (one thousand seven hundred) healthy men, women, and children between January and September 2018 at random, with a higher proportion occurring in the Middle Belt Region of Nigeria.

Furthermore, it is claimed that, if separated from other North-Central states, Benue State alone would have lost more than 1354 rural inhabitants between January 2013 and December 2017 to the danger of herders attacks (Onyishi & Oji, 2019). Small arms-related violence has gotten out of control in North Central Nigeria to the point where it threatens the country's stability. The protagonists in this circumstance believed that mass murder and ethnic cleansing were unavoidable outcomes of war, insurrection, and conflicts that many people do not even fully comprehend (Obasi, 2014). In particular, Nasarawa, Niger, and Jos, Plateau state, where the recurrent attacks are almost identical to those of Benue state not long ago, have experienced this pattern of displacement by replacement in the form of land grabs by the killer herders or bandits. According to Mzonde, whose viewpoint was cited in Salem 2021, there is no excuse on earth for the mass murder of women and children in the same way that its being done in North-Central Nigeria by the same people. Small arms and light weapons proliferation in the nation has led to an increase in small arms-induced violence, which has presented complex problems for many facets of human existence among others, to the Nigerian populace in the country's north-central region, spanning from housing, education, life expectancy, and health care facilities. The current health care system may also be directly impacted by this situation, and it may be challenging to reach those who need help in the afflicted communities

This small arms induced violence in the region has a wide variety of root causes and intensities, from interpersonal conflicts between people and groups over issues like marriage, livestock, water, and pasture to political confrontations. The conflicts have numerous and varied local roots and causes. The proliferation or accessibility of small guns, however, feeds the conflicts and makes them deadlier in almost all of them. It is undeniable that conflict over grazing rights or between pastoralists and crop farmers or between herders and herders has historically been rife in north-central Nigeria. But historically, these battles were typically fought using indigenous weaponry that minimizes losses. Due to the widespread use of small arms in the area, this has changed. Owing to the rapid spread of small guns, political disputes are being settled by the use of bullets rather than ballots, creating new security challenges. According to studies, community militias are responsible for over 40% of political violence, with the North Central region experiencing some of the greatest levels of communal group violence (Aver, 2020). Many academics have discussed the implications of these small-arms-induced conflicts from a variety of angles, including per capita income, food security, environmental issues, political difficulties, as well as health and national cohesion. However, very little attention has been paid to the indisputable effects that these small arms-induced conflicts have on the rural victims who are forced to leave their customary homes and live in IDP camps. This study aims to close this obvious gap in the existing literature. The following research questions serve as the study's guiding principles: Is there a connection between small arms-induced conflicts in Nigeria's North-Central states and the prevailing labour shortfall in

the region? Is the prevailing small arms induced violence in the North-Central Nigeria Implicated in the current shallow healthcare delivery system in the region? To respond to these questions we employed specific methods as presented below.

2. MATERIALS AND METHODS

This study's analysis used a descriptive research design. Descriptive research strategy is a scientific method in analysis that involves observing and describing the performance of the subject under study without in any way altering it. Nevertheless, a research design is a blueprint, framework, or system utilized to produce solutions to research problems (Orodho, 2003). The study will use a case study approach with the goal of evaluating the socioeconomic effects of small arms-induced conflicts in Nigeria's North Central states. Additionally, self-report technique is used for data collecting. The utilization of primary sources of data is typically required for this category of research, and as a result, the researcher must deliver questionnaires to the chosen sample that was taken from the study population. With this method, the researcher will ask the subjects (respondents) a question intended to elicit feedback on the study question (Legee and Francis, 1974). Based on this information, the participants in the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps from three of the six states in the selected geopolitical zone will be asked to provide the data for this study.

Each option in the study instrument will have a distinct weight according to the Likert scaling that was adopted, which will vary from strongly agreed (SA) = 5 to agreed (A) = 4, undecided (u) = 3, disagree (D) = 2, and strongly disagree (SD) = 1. Each question in this method or strategy for data collecting will contain five possibilities, which are divided up above to provide respondents the ability to select from a variety of other possible responses to the structured questionnaire instrument. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Camp inhabitants who have been affected by small-arms-related conflicts, National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) staff members operating among the IDPs, and medical professionals employed in these affected communities in the selected states make up the study's population. However, because the entire region is too big to administer, just two camps were picked from the three North-Central states that were chosen, namely Benue, Plateau, and the Federal Capital Territory Abuja. According to the December 2022 edition of the Global Internal Displacement Database (GIDD) as cited in IDMC (2023), these camps were Kwande IDP Camp and Ogiri Ajene IDP Camp in Benue, Geo-Science IDP Camp A & B and Kanke IDP Camp in Plateau, the New Kuchingoro IDP Camp and Kuje IDP Camp in Abuja, which is housing about fifty two thousand eight hundred and twenty 52,820 people as at the time of this study, including both the victims and staff members as well as security personnel.

Sampling Technique

Given that the projected number of the population that will be studied is estimated to be approximately 52,820 people. In determining the study sample size from the population, this study employed the Taro Yamane (1967) which is given as follows;

$$n = \frac{N}{(1 + N(e)^2)}$$

Where n = the sample size to be estimated

N = the population size (Inhabitants of the selected IDP camps in the chosen states) and

e = the error margin

$$n = \frac{52,820}{(1+52,820)(0.05)^2}$$

$$n = \frac{52,820}{(52821)(0,0025)}$$

$$n = \frac{52820}{132.0525}$$

$n = 400$ (Inhabitants of the selected IDP camps in the chosen states).

During the data collecting stage, random sampling procedures were used to distribute the 400 questionnaires to every occupant of the six chosen IDP camps in the three states picked from the North-central states. Because there are different strata in the population, the stratified sampling technique was utilized for the study, and after the population had been separated into homogenous groups, simple random sampling was used. Both strategies were based on the probability-based (random) sampling approach. Out of the 400 questionnaires that were distributed, only 355 were returned; however, of the 355 that were, 5 were disqualified for improper completion. Therefore, a total of 350 questionnaires were used for this investigation. The study used the test-retest procedure to determine the accuracy of the measuring devices that would be used to gather data. To accomplish this, we made sure that a particular questionnaire item was given to a chosen group of occupants in the IDP camps on one occasion, and then we made sure that the same group received the same item(s) again after two weeks or so to determine the degree of correlation between the two sets of scores obtained. The strength of the association was assessed using the Spearman's ranking correlation coefficient, abbreviated as r^1 the formula for the Spearman's ranking is shown below.

$$r^1 = 1 - \frac{6 \sum d_i^2}{n(n^2 - 1)}$$

Where:

- r^1 = Spearman's rank correlation coefficient
- d = difference between any pair of rank; and
- n = the number of data pairs

The dependability of the measuring instrument increases with the value of r^1 's proximity to 1, and vice versa. On two separate occasions, we administered the same test to the same set of occupants in the chosen IDP camps. A total of 156 residents of the IDP camp under study participated in the test, and the difference between the results from the two sets of tests was used to gauge the instrument's level of dependability. But frequency tables were used to illustrate the data that had been gathered. In respect to the total number of respondents for this study, the responses from the study sample were reported as percentages. In particular, every questionnaire item created for this study demonstrated a commitment to pursuing the accomplishment of the study's preliminary research objectives, which would then be examined using the Carl Pearson Product Moment Correlation and the modified student t test statistical tools. If the estimated value exceeds the critical value of the statistical instrument that would be applied at the 5% level of significance, H_0 should be discarded. However, if the calculated number is smaller, we will not accept the alternative hypothesis but rather the H_0 will be accepted.

Theoretical Framework

The study used William Zartman's (1995) "theory of failed state" as its analytical framework. According to Zartman, a state is considered collapsed when its fundamental functions are no longer carried out on its territory. To put it another way, a state has collapsed when it is unable to continue offering the services that made it necessary to exist. State failure is defined by Robert Rotberg (2003), another influential proponent of the notion of failed states, as the inability of states to offer their citizens beneficial political goods. A failed

state, according to Anyanwu (2005), as cited in Abiodun (2018), is one in which social and political systems have been completely destroyed. He asserted that failure on the social, political, and economic fronts define it. Zartman and Rotberg make distinctions between a range of services that states may offer, they include the provision of infrastructure, and social services like health and education, the protection of property, from security to the rule of law as well as the right to participate in politics. This study is aware that, in addition to the security-related duties mentioned above, a formal organization's claim to being a state depends on the accomplishment of additional duties. However, considering the fact that other duties cannot flourish without security, as stated by Rotberg (2003), these functions form a hierarchy with security as its base.

Given that security is a must for the provision of all other services, including socio-political and economic development, as well as health and infrastructures, security is the most fundamental service that states offer. According to the theory, when a state fails, violent extremist groups flourish because they can no longer be refuted, as is the case in Nigeria. For instance, 12 people were kidnapped and 20 died in attacks on six communities in Bornu and Adamawa State on December 24 and 26, precisely as the number of IDP camps grew (Bureau of Counterterrorism, 2020). A state failure refers to the breakdown of state institutions, particularly the police and judiciary, with the consequent paralysis of governance, collapse of law and order, and general banditry and disorder. Given that the inability of the Nigerian state to defend the territory over which it claimed supremacy is one of the primary indicators of a failed state, in accordance with the basic tenets of the theory (Zartman, 1995; Rotberg 2003; Clarke, 2015; Abiodun, 2018), the implications of small arms-induced violence in Nigeria can only be understood within the framework of a failed state. Furthermore, Abdul-Azeez Suleiman, as cited in Gabriel, (2022), asserted that the presence of these killer herdsman, now known as bandits or warlords, had cast doubt on the Nigerian State's very existence and made it appear to be a failed State from all appearances. According to the notion of the failed state, this is because it can no longer carry out the fundamental tasks for which it was created (Zartman, 1995). It is also support one of the central tenets of the theory, which insists that security is a requirement for the provision of all other social services without which the people will turn to self help that will inescapably lead to social disorder given that the state shall be considered failed at that point (Rotberg, 2003). This is because it got to the point where citizens were encouraged to turn to self-protection because, clearly the bandits and insurgents have noticed a vacuum in the capacity and political will of Nigeria leaders to challenge them (Gabriel, 2022). Although the Nigerian government may be ready to go to battle with these outlaws, non-state actors are fundamentally different from government agents in that they are constantly moving targets. They rely on highly dispersed systems that are capable of independent action and survival.

No area of the nation is now unaffected, therefore the list of domestic problems is lengthy and expanding. As predicted by the basic tenets of the theory of failed state Nigeria has reached the point when a non-state actor threatens the state players (Rotberg 2003; Clarke, 2015). The obvious threats to kidnap the President and a serving governor demonstrated how inadequate the state was and how much ground had been ceded to outlaws (Gabriel, 2022). In synopsis, the seeming pressures to foresee and react to state failure have grown over the past few years, but not only are government functions hypnotized, but experienced officials are also killed, abducted, or forced to flee the country while their assets are destroyed or looted (Ayitogo, 2021). The argument that the Nigerian government had failed to retain a monopoly on the legal use of physical force within its borders, which is a sign of a failed state as maintained by the theory, is only supported by this development.

Small Arm Induced Conflicts and Socio-economic Development

Conflicts have existed between people since the dawn of mankind. Additionally, man has developed sophisticated methods for resolving disagreements over the centuries. Conflicts within individuals, groups, or societies are common and widely acknowledged as one of the results of social interaction. This is immensely the situation in North Central Nigeria, but due to the proliferation of small arms in the region, these conflicts

now have a totally different purpose and method of execution than was previously recognized. Conflicts brought on by small arms cause more severe injuries to the victims, which raises concern in any culture where they occur. As a result, there is an increase in instability in the north-central regions of Nigeria owing to small-arms violence, which has been made worse by the escalating terrorism in the area (Ali, 2015). Conflict in the region is thought to be fueled by multiculturalism or plurality, however several academics have found in the literature that the availability of small guns makes it worse (Bello, 2013; Ali, 2015; Salem, 2021). According to some academics, the current violence in the area is a result of ethnic and religious conflicts that occurred before Nigeria became a governmental entity (Olaniyan, & Yahaya, 2016). Others, on the other hand, base their arguments on a multiplicity of variables centered around four crucial development nuggets, namely, environmental degradation throughout Africa's Sahel region, the ongoing expansion of land under-cultivation, the decline of traditional authority figures, and the recent emergence of large-scale cattle rustling in the north central (Bello, 2013).

Although the accessibility of small arms led to calamitous tendencies in the research area and elsewhere, Colletta and Kostner (2000) noted that these tendencies have negative effects on the victims. He argues that wars caused by small arms have a substantial impact on the ability of the afflicted nations to carry out national development initiatives in the conflict regions. On the one hand, they contended that the majority would suffer greatly if national resources were diverted from providing social welfare to the purchase of weaponry. According to other academics, when development initiatives are carried out in unstable areas, "project staff may be at risk, project sites may stay unemployed by the population out fear of being considered as aligning with the government, and the location may draw armed attacks to interrupt the development process" (Colletta & Kostner 2000; Bello, 2013; Ali, 2015; Salem, 2021). The proportionate impact on the gross domestic product (GDP) and government budgets is higher in developing countries, even though the absolute expenses of responding to small arms-induced violence may be higher in the developed economy. For example, the cost of small arms-related violence in Latin America in 1997 (\$143 billion) was comparable to 12% of GDP due to a mix of lost human capital, private investment, and asset transfers (Londono & Guerrero 1998). The effects of small arms-induced conflict are seemingly endless and have an impact on every aspect of human existence. For instance, it can be challenging to recruit medical professionals and educators for jobs in places where there is a higher chance that they will be affected by small arms-induced conflict. In other words, the accessibility of small arms will make it difficult to implement development goals, let alone achieve them in the first place (Okeke & Oji, 2014). He argued that any civilization where firearms are the norm has a propensity to be underdeveloped because businesses such as stores, schools, and retail outlets will shut down, and the local economy will suffer.

Once more, the destruction of infrastructural services makes life extremely complicated for the victims and others around them because others are afraid to return to their homes or lead regular lives for fear of assault (Usage, Ugwumba & Edom, 2014). Additionally, because most persons with impairments brought on by firearms rely on their families, they are unable to increase their labour force in order to make up for lost revenue. Therefore, it is hypothesized that a sizable fraction of non-fatally injured patients incur debt as a result of small arms caused conflict in order to pay for medical expenditures and other miscellaneous necessities (Small Arms Survey, 2012). The World Bank (2001), on the other hand, observed that countries that experience such pervasive societal crises as small arms-induced conflict suffer disproportionately from negative growth and a significant decline in foreign direct investment (FDI). They maintain that, in terms of social and economic investment, the opportunity costs of small arms-induced conflicts to the affected country and the region are very valuable. Conflict and violence, for instance, were rated as the top security risk for investors worldwide in a poll of firms for the World Development Report (Valenti, Ormhaug, Mtonga, & Loretz 2007). This truth is straightforward since social exclusion has many different aspects, including social, political, cultural, and

economic ones. It is the result of unequal power relations and has distinct long-term effects on people (Khan et al. 2015 as referenced in Yahaya, 2021). Because social exclusion is a result of arms conflicts in other parts of the world, multidimensional data collection is crucial for understanding and addressing the social issues caused by small arms related conflicts.

The preliminary paragraphs of this section systematically explored the causes of small arms-induced conflicts, and the subsequent paragraphs did same on its consequences. We have observed that the literature currently in circulation focuses more on the broad effects of small arms-induced conflict, including social exclusion, GDP growth rate, foreign direct investment FDI, labor supply, income shortfalls, etc. on the affected societies globally, without making any specific mention of its effects on the social existence of direct victims of these conflicts in North-Central Nigeria, whose social and civil fabric has been stretched beyond its breaking point with small arms. The result of a culture of violence that has spread throughout the entire nation as well as the region in various but connected forms and at various levels requires systematic approach for total comprehension. And more importantly, past research on small-arms-induced violence mainly focused on what motivates it in urban centers generally rather than much on how it affects socioeconomic growth. This study is being conducted with a focus on its impact in the North-Central region of Nigeria as a result of this obvious vacuum in the associated literature that already exists. The study is therefore, guided by the following research questions; Is there a relationship between small arms induced conflicts in the North-Central states of Nigeria and the prevailing labour shortfall in the region? Is the prevailing small arms induced violence in the North-Central Nigeria Implicated in the current shallow healthcare delivery system in the region?

Data Presentation and Analysis

Frequency tables were used to present the data that was gathered. In respect to the total number of respondents for this study, the responses from the study sample were reported as percentages. In particular, every questionnaire item created for this study demonstrated a commitment to pursuing the accomplishment of the study's preliminary research objectives, which would then be examined using the Carl Pearson Product Moment Correlation and the modified student t test statistical tools. If the calculated value exceeds the critical value of the statistical instrument that would be applied at the 5% level of significance, Ho should be discarded. However, if the calculated value is lower, then we shall not reject the Ho and accept the alternative hypothesis

Table 4.1. Distribution of the Study Population and Sample size (%).

S/N	State	IDP Camps	Population	Sample Size (%)
1	Abuja	New Kuchingoro IDP Camp (7230)	16506	117 (0.71%)
		Kuje IDP Camp (9,230)		
2	Benue	Ogiri Ajene IDP Camp (9,506)	18808	150 (0.8%)
		Kwande IDP Camp (9,302)		
3	Plateau	Kanke IDP Camp (7,845)	17506	133 (0.76%)
		Geo-Science IDP Camp A & B (9, 661)		
Total			52820	400 (0.76 %)

Source: IDMC (2023)

Table 4.1 demonstrates that among the four IDP camps in Abuja, the New Kuchingoro IDP camp and the well-known Kuje IDP camp was chosen for this study. Sixteen thousand five hundred and six (16506) people were living in both camps as of the time of this study, with the New Kuchingoro IDP Camp housing seven thousand two hundred and thirty (7230) people, or 43.8% of the study population, and the Kuje IDP Camp housing

roughly nine thousand two hundred and thirty (9,230) people, or 55.9% of the study population. However, a total of one hundred and seventeen (117) samples, or around 0.71% of the intended sample size were taken from each camp. The Ogiri Ajene IDP Camp and Kwande IDP Camp, which respectively house 9,506 and 9,302 people, or 50.54% and 49.46% of the study population, are shown in table 4.1 above. These two camps were chosen for the study out of the twenty-seven IDP camps in Benue State, according to the Benue State Emergency Management Agency SEMA, as cited in Duru (2023). 150 samples in all, or 0.8% of the study sample, were chosen from each of the two populations. Last but not least, two IDP camps with seventeen thousand five hundred and six (17506) occupants each were chosen for the study from among the thirty-one IDP camps located in Plateau State, according to the Plateau State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) as cited in MAN (2018). These camps are the Kanke Camp, which has seven hundred and eighty four five (7,845) occupants, or 44.8% of the study population, and the Geo-Science Camp A & B camp, which has nine thousand six hundred and sixty one (9661) The study's sample size was 133, or 0.76% of the combined populations of the two camps. Keep in mind that the population of these particular camps depends on the information released by IDMC in 2023 as extracted from States Emergency Management Agency (SEMA).

Analysis of Questionnaire

Section A

Table 4.2. Sex Distribution of the Respondents.

Gender	Respondents	% of Respondents By Sex
Male	130	62.86%
Female	220	37.14%
Total	350	100%

Source: Field Survey 2023.

In order to determine the pattern of distribution of the respondents by sex, the gender of the respondents from the six IDP camps was examined. According to table 4.2's analysis, out of 350 respondents, 220 (62.86%) were female and 130 (37.14%) were male. This suggests that there were more female than male residents in the IDP camps being researched in the north-central states of Nigeria.

Table 4.3. Marital Status of Respondents.

Options	Respondents	% of Respondents by Marital Status
Married	131	37.4%
Single	187	53.4%
Divorced	13	3.7%
Widowed	18	5.1%
Separated	2	0.6%
Total	350	100%

Source: Field Survey 2023.

Table 4.3 shows that out of the 350 respondents, 131(37.4%) of the sample were married, while 187(53.4%) of the sample were single. Thirteen respondents representing 3.7% of the sample were divorced, 18 (5.1%) were widowed, and two respondents representing 0.57% of the sample were separated. In the IDP camps in

the region under study, this translates to a higher percentage of single occupants than married, including divorced, widowed, and separated occupants combined. Most likely due to the frequent attacks by the killer herdsmen, Boko-haram, and other rogues preventing people in the area from getting married or possibly due to apprehension about starting a family in such a hostile environment.

Table 4.4. The Distribution of Respondents by Age.

Options	Respondents	% of Respondents by Age
Less than 20 years	30	8.57%
21-30 years	142	40.57%
31- 40 years	71	20.29%
41- 50 years	60	17.14%
50 – 60 years	30	8.57%
60 years and above	17	4.86%
Total	350	100%

Source: Field Survey 2023

Table 4.4 above again shows that out of 350 respondents, 40 (8.57%) were under the age of 20, 142 (40.57%) were between the ages of 21 and 30, 71 (20.29%) were between the ages of 31 and 40, 60 (17.14%) were between the ages of 41 and 50, 30 (8.57%) are between the ages of 51 and 60, and 17 (4.86%) were over the age of 60. This indicates that at the Internally Displaced People's IDP camps under study, a larger percentage of the occupants are between the ages of 21 and 30.

Table 4.5. Educational Qualifications of Respondents.

Options	Respondents	% of Respondents By Educational Qualification
FSLC	10	2.9 %
SSCE/NECO	61	17.4%
OND/NCE	68	19.4 %
Undergraduates	92	26.3%
B.Sc/HND	78	22.3%
MBA/M.Sc	40	11.4 %
P.hD	1	0.3 %
Total	350	100 %

Source: Field Survey 2023

In order to determine the respondents' degree of literacy while taking into account their situation in the IDP camps, the respondents' educational background was examined. Table 4.5's analysis results show that 10 respondents, or 2.9% of the sample, has FSLC, 61 respondents (17.4%) has SSCE/NECO, 68 respondents (19.4%) has OND/NCE, while 92 respondents (26.3%) were university freshmen, and 78 respondents (22.3%) had a B.Sc. or HND. As mentioned above, the study's camps also house 40 (11.4%) occupants with MBA/M.Sc. degrees. And 1 (0.3%) PhD holder that was unemployed as at the time of the study. This finding shows that respondents had a respectable level of education because 34.0% of the sample had a B.Sc. or above in education.

Section B.

In this phase, the research questions pertaining to the independent and dependent variables of the study issue were used to examine the hypothesis. Accepting highest percentage number as the direction of these respondents is the deciding criterion. The five points Likert scale of strongly agreed (SA). Agreed (A), undecided (U), disagreed (D) and strongly disagreed (SD) is used with the weight averages of 5, 4, 3, 2 and 1 respectively as already indicated in methodology.

Table 4.6. There is a Positive Relationship Between Small Arms Induced Conflicts in the North-Central States of Nigeria and the Prevailing Labour Shortfall in The Region.

S/n	Variables	SA (5)	A (4)	U (3)	D (2)	SD (1)
1	The prevailing violence in North-central Nig has nothing to do with the paucity of labourers in the region	115 (33%)	95 (27%)	80 (23%)	40 (11%)	20 (6%)
2	Small arms induced conflicts do not discourage people to go to their farms	27 (8%)	38 (11%)	76 (22%)	99 (28%)	110 (31%)
3	Violence in the North-Central Nig usually lead to destruction of farm tools	110 (31%)	75 (21%)	40 (11%)	100 (29%)	25 (7%)
4	Farm settlements in the North-central Nig is not affected by the recurrent conflicts in the region	20 (6%)	40 (11%)	76 (22%)	98 (28%)	116 (33%)
5	The existing labour migration in the region is a consequence of small arms induced conflicts	120 (34%)	90 (26%)	75 (21%)	30 (9%)	35 (10%)

First, responses to hypothesis one, which seek to unveil if there is a positive relationship between small arms induced conflicts in the North-Central states of Nigeria and the prevailing labour shortfall in the region, are shown in Table 4.6 above. 115 respondents (33%) strongly agreed, 95 respondents (27%) agreed, 80 respondents (23%) were undecided, 40 respondents (11%) disagreed, and 20 respondents (6%) strongly disagreed that the violence that is currently occurring in North-Central Nigeria has nothing to do with the region's lack of labourers. The highest incidence is 33% in SA, proving that the lack of labourers in North-central Nig has little to do with the prevailing violence in the area. Second, when argued that small arms induced conflicts do not discourages people to go to their farms, 27 respondents (8%) strongly agreed, 38 respondents (11%) agreed, 76 respondents (22%) were undecided, 99 respondents (28%) disagreed, and 110 respondents (31%) severely disagreed. SD is the circumstance that occurs the most frequently at (31%), therefore small arms-induced confrontations deters people from going to their farms. Additionally, 110 respondents (31%) strongly agreed, 75 respondents (21%) agreed, and 40 respondents (11%) were hesitant when asked whether violence in the North-Central Nig generally results in the damage of farm tools. 25 responses (7%) and 100 respondents (29%) disagreed strongly. It follows that violence in the North-Central Nig usually lead to destruction of farm tools with 31% frequency, Regarding the issue of whether or not the region's ongoing hostilities have an impact on farm settlements in North Central Nigeria. Twenty respondents (6%) strongly agreed, forty (11%) agreed, 76 (26%) were unsure, 98 (28%) disagreed, and 116 (33%) severely disagreed. The SD has the greatest percentage frequency of 33%, therefore the ongoing conflicts in the area have a severe impact on farm settlements in north-central Nigeria. Finally, a total of 120 respondents (34%) highly agreed, 90 respondents (26%) agreed, 75 respondents (21%) were undecided, while 30 respondents (9%) and 35 respondents (10%) strongly disagreed that the region's current labour migration is a result of small

arms-induced conflicts. With SA having the highest percentage frequency (34%) the current labour movement in the region is a result of conflicts caused by small arms.

Table 4.7. The Prevailing Small Arms Induced Violence in The North-Central Nigeria Is Implicated in The Shallow Healthcare Delivery System in The Region.

S/n	Variables	SA (5)	A (4)	U (3)	D (2)	SD (1)
6	The small arms induced conflicts in North-Central Nig do not affect the standard of healthcare delivery system in the region	100 (29%)	95 (27%)	73 (21%)	25 (7%)	47 (13%)
7	Healthcare services in North-Central Nig has not been hindered by the recurrent small arms induces violence in the region	47 (13%)	25 (7%)	70 (20%)	95 (27%)	103 (29%)
8	The healthcare workers in the region are adversely affected by the recurrent small arms induced violence in the region	104 (30%)	94 (27%)	68 (19%)	26 (7%)	48 (13%)
9	There is observable development in the health sector since the emergence of small arms induced violence in the region	73 (21%)	25 (7%)	47 (13%)	100 (29%)	95 (27%)
10	The low standard healthcare delivery system in North-Central Nig is a consequence of small arms induced violence in the region	110 (31%)	90 (26%)	80 (23%)	30 (9%)	40 (11%)

Table 4.7 above shows responses related to hypothesis two which states that the prevailing small arms induced violence in the North-Central Nigeria is implicated in the shallow healthcare delivery system in the region. From the responses on the questionnaires as presented above on whether the small arms induced conflicts in North-Central Nigeria do not affect the standard of healthcare delivery system in the region 100 respondents (29%) strongly agreed, 95 respondents (27%) agreed, 73 respondents (21%) were undecided, 25 respondents (7%) disagreed, while 47 respondents (13%) strongly disagreed. which means that SA has the most frequency with 29%, in other words, the small arms induced conflicts in North-Central Nig do not affect the standard of healthcare delivery system in the region. furthermore, for the question on whether healthcare services in North-Central Nig has not been hindered by the recurrent small arms induces violence in the region, 47 respondents (13%) strongly agreed, 25 respondents (7%) agreed, 70 respondents (20%) were undecided, 95 respondents (27%) disagreed, while 103 respondents (29%) strongly disagreed. This means that healthcare service in North-Central Nigeria has been hindered by the recurrent small arms induces violence in the region since SD has 29% frequency. On whether the healthcare workers in the region are adversely affected by the recurrent small arms induced violence in the region 104 respondents (30%) strongly agreed, 94 respondents (27%) agreed, 68 respondents (19%) were undecided, 26 respondents (7%) disagreed, while 48 respondents (13%) strongly disagreed. With SA frequency on 30%, the response is that the healthcare workers in the region are adversely affected by the recurrent small arms induced violence in the region. For the question on whether there is observable development in the health sector since the emergence of small arms induced violence in the region, 73 respondents (21%) strongly agreed, 25 respondents (7%) agreed, 47 respondents (13%) were undecided, 100 respondents (29%) disagreed, while 95 respondents (27%) strongly disagreed. The distribution of

percentage response indicates that there is no observable development in the health sector since the emergence of small arms induced violence in the region with 29% D and 27% SD respectively. Finally, on whether the low standard healthcare delivery system in North-Central Nig is a consequence of small arms induced violence in the region, 110 respondents (31%) strongly agreed, 90 respondents (26%) agreed, 80 respondents (23%) were undecided, 30 respondents (9%) disagreed, while 40 respondents (11%) strongly disagreed. In other words, the low standard healthcare delivery system in North-Central Nigeria is a consequence of Small arms induced violence in the region with the 31% SA affirmative response frequency

Test of Hypotheses

We shall now test our two hypotheses formulated from the research questions articulated in our preliminary session based on the responses from our population samples as previously presented.

Test of hypothesis One

H₁: There is a positive relationship between small arms induced conflicts in the North-Central states of Nigeria and the prevailing labour shortfall in the region

H₀: There is a negative relationship between small arms induced conflicts in the North-Central states of Nigeria and the prevailing labour shortfall in the region

The Karl Pearson’s product moment correlation coefficient was used to test the significant of the responses from the questionnaires (respondents). Nevertheless, in the Karl Pearson’s product moment correlation two statistical strategies or methods are available for the computation of **r**, they are;

- a. The use of mean and
- b. The raw score formula

The "raw score formula" was used in the computation of the data acquired for this study in order to make the methodologies used easier to understand.

	X	Y	XY	X²	Y²
SA	120	115	13800	14400	13225
A	90	95	8550	8100	9025
U	75	80	6000	5625	6400
D	30	40	1200	900	1600
SD	35	20	700	1225	400
TOTAL	350	350	30250	30250	30650

Using the Karl Pearson’s product moment correlation formula (the Raw Score) which is given as:

$$r = \frac{N \sum XY - (\sum X)(\sum Y)}{\sqrt{n(\sum X^2) - (\sum X)^2} \sqrt{n(\sum Y^2) - (\sum Y)^2}} \quad \text{we compute:}$$

$$r = \frac{5x30250 - (350)(350)}{5x30250 - (350)^2 \sqrt{5x30650 - (350)^2}}$$

$$r = \frac{151250 - 122500}{\sqrt{151250 - 122500} \sqrt{153250 - 122500}}$$

$$r = \frac{28750}{\sqrt{2875} \sqrt{30750}} \quad r = \frac{2875}{169.56x175.36}$$

$$r = \frac{2875}{29734.04} \quad r = 0.967$$

The aforementioned finding demonstrates a nearly perfect correlation between conflicts caused by small arms in Nigeria's North-Central states and the prevailing labour shortfall in the region. However, by translating the r value, which is 0.967, to t scores, we can now assess the strength of the correlation. The modified student's t test is the technique utilized in this study to determine the significance of the correlation coefficient. Using the following formula;

$$t = r \sqrt{\frac{n-2}{1-r^2}} \text{ we comput}$$

$$t = 0.967 \frac{\sqrt{5-2}}{1-(0.967)^2}$$

$$t = 0.967 \frac{\sqrt{3}}{1-0.935} \quad t = 0.967 \frac{\sqrt{3}}{0.065} \quad r = \sqrt{46.15}$$

$$t = 0.967 \times 6.79 \quad : t = 6.57$$

The value of t for 0.05 and 3 degrees of freedom is 3.182 where n is the number of observations, n-2 is the degree of freedom, r is the correlation coefficient. Making a decision: The computed value is more than the tabulated value, or 6.57 > 3.82, because the above tabulated value of 0.05 at 3 degrees of freedom is 3.182. Therefore, we accept the H1, which asserts that "There is a positive relationship between small arms induced conflicts in the North-Central states of Nigeria and the current labor shortfall in the region," and reject the H0.

Test of Hypothesis Two

H1: The prevailing small arms induced violence in the North-Central Nigeria is implicated in the current shallow healthcare delivery system in the region

H₀: The prevailing small arms induced violence in the North-Central Nigeria is not implicated in the current shallow healthcare delivery system in the region

The significance of the responses from the questionnaires' (respondents') was also evaluated using the Karl Pearson's product moment correlation coefficient. However, there are two statistical approaches or methods that can be used to calculate the r in the Karl Pearson's product moments correlation coefficient. These are;

- a. The use of mean and
- b. The raw score formula

This study chose to compute the data acquired for this study using the "raw score formula" since it made the method's application easier to understand.

	X	Y	XY	X ²	Y ²
SD	110	102	11220	12100	10,404
A	90	97	8730	8100	9409
U	80	75	6000	6400	5625
D	30	27	810	900	729
SD	40	49	1960	1600	2401
TOTAL	350	350	28720	29100	28568

Using the Karl Pearson's product moment correlation formula (the Raw score) which is given as;

$$r = \frac{N \sum XY - (\sum X)(\sum Y)}{\sqrt{n(\sum X^2) - (\sum X)^2} \sqrt{n(\sum Y^2) - (\sum Y)^2}} \quad \text{we compute:}$$

$$r = \frac{5 \times 28720 - (350)(350)}{\sqrt{5 \times 29100 - (350)^2} \sqrt{5 \times 28568 - (350)^2}}$$

$$r = \frac{143600 - 122500}{\sqrt{141500 - 122500} \sqrt{142840 - 122500}}$$

$$r = \frac{21100}{\sqrt{23000} \sqrt{20340}} \quad r = \frac{21100}{151.66 \times 142.62}$$

$$= \frac{21100}{21629.75} \quad r = 0.975$$

Once more, the above result showed a nearly perfect association between " the prevailing small arms induced violence in the North-Central Nigeria and the current shallow healthcare delivery system in the region" The same as previously, we will now transform the 0.975 r value to a t test to assess the strength of the positive

association. As was already mentioned, the modified student t test was used in this study to examine the significance of the correlation coefficient. Using the formula below;

$$t = r \sqrt{\frac{n-2}{1-r^2}} \quad \text{we compute:}$$

$$t = 0.975 \frac{\sqrt{5-3}}{1-(0.975)^2}$$

$$t = 0.975 \frac{\sqrt{3}}{1-0.975} \quad t = 0.975 \frac{\sqrt{3}}{0.036} \quad t = 0.975 \sqrt{83.33}$$

$$t = 0.975 \times 9.13$$

$$t = 8.90$$

Where **n** represents the number of observations and n-2 is the degree of freedom. The critical value of t for $\alpha=0.05$ and three degrees of freedom is 3.182, while r is the correlation coefficient. Decision Rules: We reject the H_0 and accept the H_1 , which stated that "The current shallow healthcare delivery system in the region is implicated in the prevailing small arms induced violence in the North-Central Nigeria region," because the tabulated value of 0.05 at 3 degrees of freedom is 3.182.

3. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Small arms-induced conflicts in the North-Central states of Nigeria and the area's ongoing labor shortage have been shown to be positively correlated in the preceding sections utilizing a descriptive research design and self-report technique. The prevalent small-arms-induced violence in North-Central Nigeria was also shown to be a factor in the region's underdeveloped healthcare delivery system in this same section. To put it another way, the proliferation of small arms in Nigeria has practically had an impact on the major development indices used in this study, which were derived from the 2020 United Nations/World Bank development indicators, with a focus on trends in health and the economy as well as trends of avoidable attacks and deaths, etc. Of course, this impact is not beneficial but rather detrimental. In addition to the quantitative revelation, the quantitative data as well showed how the use of small arms has aided the killer herdsman, the Boko-haram sects, and other unsavoury groups in the country wreak havoc in the lives of rural farmers in north central Nigeria and other parts of the country, which unexpectedly put a stop to their contribution to Nigeria's development agenda. Therefore, it claimed that the spread of small guns and their societal infiltration fuels regional conflicts and, consequently, has a detrimental impact on the socioeconomic growth trajectory in the North Central States. Conflicts caused by small guns have had a deleterious impact on practically every aspect of Nigerian life, including national cohesion. Conflicts caused by small guns in Nigeria have the opportunity cost of fostering long-term insecurity, as is evident in the country today. It is difficult to find a universal cure for the epidemic of small arms and light weapons proliferation, however, given the unique status of this class of weapons. However, in every civilization where they are accepted, these small arms and light weapons encourage and exacerbate banditry. They undoubtedly contribute to and exacerbate conflicts in any culture where they are permitted to flourish, but they do not initiate them since they are unable to do so without help from humans.

Furthermore, since this category of weapons also has a valuable function, managing them necessitates a tactical approach that can only be provided by the government. They perform their tasks properly in the governing process and are frequently utilized by the rural population in hunting to supplement the subregion's traditional diet of starch. Additionally, references to national security and state sovereignty are common in discussions of small and light weaponry. Therefore, in the end, only governments have the power to draft and implement agreements regarding the sale and transfer of weapons.

Recommendations

In this study, we have made an effort to assess the socioeconomic effects of small arms-related violence on corporate life in Nigeria, with a focus on the north-central part of the nation. Small arms-related violence has resulted in a serious security situation in the country, which has been shown in this study to have had a negative impact on the socioeconomic development of the area, as well as the actions of migrant bandits, Boko-haram, and killer herdsmen toward rural farmers in north-central Nigeria. However, a diverse and all-encompassing strategy is required to handle the intricate problems of weapon proliferation and illegal trafficking in Nigeria. Unfortunately, there isn't presently a formalized procedure in place for this purpose, or if there is, it is currently underfunded and fragmented. As a result, there are no formal sub-regional initiatives to curb the country's illicit arms trade and lessen the carnage brought on by conflicts sparked by small arms. Plans to create effective restrictions on the exchange of legal firearms between citizens and state security forces are still lacking. Measures for disarming ex- servicemen, eliminating illegitimate arsenal from civilians, and cautiously destroying additional provisions of arms or illicit weapons that have been seized are all equally in the same shape

This study robustly advises that the federal government immediately look for a comprehensive anti-small arms proliferation program that might provide results without alienating the general population in view of the aforementioned realities. Secondly, whatever method is employed, it must never incite a sense of threat among the public. A two-pronged approach is also recommended by the report to stop the spread of small guns and light weapons. First, a two-way control agreement must be reached with the operators of the sub-region's small arms and light weapon conduit, exporting nations (primarily from Eastern and Central Europe), brokers, and private military entrepreneurs regarding the regulation of small arms and light weapons to and from Nigeria. Finally, the government should do everything possible to reduce the tension already existent in the nation while also removing small arms and light weapons from the public. Along with the program, concrete actions that reduce societal tensions must be taken. Finally, if someone or any group is seen to be lacking, one must treat them with respect, not considering their tribe or belief.

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